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THE END OF REASONABLENESS IN THE
REASONABLENESS CLAUSE
ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA
Diane M. Smith*
INTRODUCTION
According to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, this was the "perfect case."
1 An
overzealous police officer aggressively berated, handcuffed, and hauled to jail a
non-confrontational mother of two small children, and in the process terrified her
children, for the offense of not wearing a seat belt.' The Supreme Court even
admitted that if it were to derive a rule to address the facts of this case, Ms.
Atwater would probably prevail.' The Court said, "The physical incidents of
arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was
(at best) exercising extremely poor judgment. Atwater's claim to live free of
pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can
raise against it specific to her case."4 Even with the perfect case, the U. S.
Supreme Court found, by a margin of five to four, that the Fourth Amendment
right of a citizen to be free from unreasonable seizure will not protect an individ-
ual from the indiscriminate harassment by a police officer satisfying his own per-
sonal interests.
The primary question presented in this case, whether it is constitutional to
subject an individual to a full custodial arrest for an offense punishable only by a
fine, was one of first impression for the Court.' Although the Court looked to the
common law to determine the reasonableness of a warrantless misdemeanor
arrest, the results were inconclusive.' Rather than performing the requisite bal-
ancing of interests generally completed when history is inconclusive,7 the Court
created a new rule, contrary to its own precedent, removing the requirement that
the government must have an interest in or justification for the arrest.8 The
Supreme Court ultimately based its decision on practicality - "a responsible
Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive,
case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judg-
ment in the field be converted into an occasion for constitutional review."9
Controversy and dissent cast a shadow on the Atwater case, and the ramifica-
tions of the Supreme Court decision are bleak when viewed in the context of
individual freedom from unreasonable conduct of law enforcement officers - a
particularly relevant decision in light of the controversies surrounding racial pro-
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1. Justice O'Connor, during Oral Arguments, 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 75, 89 (Dec. 2000)(No. 99-
1408), Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 US. 318 (2001).
2. Atwater, 165 F.3d 380, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1999).
3. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346.
4. Id. (From the majority opinion declaring constitutional custodial arrests for fine only offenses).
5. Id. at 362.
6. Id. at 363.
7. Id. at 361 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 654 (1979); and Pennsylvania v. Minuns, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).
8. Id. at 354.
9. Atwater 532 U.S. at 347 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973)).
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filing and indiscriminant stopping and searching of vehicles in the name of the
"war on drugs."
The Supreme Court has, until now, at least paid lip service to the command of
the Fourth Amendment that all searches and seizures must be reasonable, a com-
mand that has been the hallmark of Fourth Amendment analysis. As will be
shown in this note, even the Supreme Court's continuous eroding of Fourth
Amendment protections has been done in the name of reasonableness. However,
when the reasonableness test, applied since the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio10 ,
did not produce the desired results, the majority abandoned it for a per se rule
that all arrests are reasonable, even those for minor traffic offenses, if the police
officer has probable cause to believe the offense has occurred.
The major problem with this decision is that the Court ignored its own Fourth
Amendment precedent, opting instead for administrative ease in law enforce-
ment." In contrast, Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in this case expressed
the correct view that "the touchstone of [the Court's] analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particu-
lar governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security."'2
This casenote explores the Atwater case and the law behind Fourth
Amendment reasonableness, in order to make sense of the Court's seeming abdi-
cation of responsibility to ensure that seizures be reasonable as required by the
Fourth Amendment. Section II summarizes many of the cases relied upon by the
Supreme Court in its decision, and gives a perspective on the Court's reasonable-
ness analyses over the past 100 years. Section III gives an overview of the facts
of the case, and highlights the decisions of each of the lower courts. Section IV
reviews both the Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions, and Section V
explains how the majority opinion was contrary to Supreme Court precedence in
this case. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper by discussing the possible ram-
ifications of this decision.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of the people to be protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 3
10. 392 U.S. 1(1968).
11. See generally Atwater, 532 U.S. 318.
12. Id. at 360.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV
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B. Case Law
The Atwater case was decided based on search and seizure case law, because
any arrest is a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.14 The
United States Supreme Court discussed the personal security and privacy protec-
tions afforded by the Fourth Amendment in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United
States: 5
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of consti-
tutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of
the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the break-
ing of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence ......
In Weeks v. United States," a 1914 case that established the exclusionary
rule,18 the Court charged all federal officials including the courts with upholding
this right of personal liberty and security. In Weeks, police arrested defendant
Weeks, without a warrant, at his place of employment, while other officers
searched Week's place of lodging, also without a warrant. 9 Weeks was convicted
of using the mails to transport lottery tickets.2" The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's decision based on the use of unauthorized evidence obtained with-
out a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment."
Eleven years later, the Court crafted an "automobile exception" to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement in the 1925 case of Carroll v. United States,22
in which the defendants contended that the search and seizure of their automo-
bile were in violation of the Fourth Amendment because they were stopped and
their car was searched without a warrant. 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the con-
victions based on the logic that the agents had reasonable cause to believe that
the car the defendants were traveling in contained intoxicating spirituous liquor
in violation of the National Prohibition Act, and under these facts the search and
seizure would not be unreasonable.24
14. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
16. Id. at 630.
17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The exclusionary rule prevents the use of evidence in
a trial if it is acquired in violation of the Constitution. The purpose is to deter future misconduct of the police.
19. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 386-88.
22. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23. Id. at 132.
24. Id. at 162.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Although the Court acknowledged that, prior to this, a warrantless search was
considered a violation of the Fourth Amendment, it stated that the Fourth
Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only those that are
unreasonable.2" Non-malicious warrantless searches and seizures were reasonable
where it was not practicable to secure a warrant, if there was probable cause that
could support a warrant.26 The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
when the amendment was adopted, and in a manner, which will conserve public
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.2 Thus, in this
early case, the Court looked to the common law, the government's interest in law
enforcement, and the individual rights of citizens in crafting this Fourth
Amendment exception.
In the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio,28 the Court shifted away from requiring
probable cause for every search and seizure, by allowing something less than a
full search and seizure - a stop and a "pat down" - in the absence of probable
cause, if there was at least reasonable suspicion that a person was involved in
criminal activity and had a weapon that could be a danger to the officer. 9 The
Court stated, "We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this
question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive
area of police activity - issues which have never before been squarely presented
to this Court."2" The Court began the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analy-
sis:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of oth-
ers, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. 1
We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places,"32 and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
"expectation of privacy," he is entitled to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this
right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For "what the
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures." Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in
Cleveland. The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-
the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an
unreasonable search and seizure. 3
25. Id. at 147.
26. Id. at 153-54.
27. Id. at 149.
28. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 9-10.
31. Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
32. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
33. Id. (citations omitted).
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The Court acknowledged that there were two distinct sides to the argument.
The State argued that, due to the dangerous situation on the city streets, police
needed an escalating set of flexible responses, based on the amount of informa-
tion they possessed about the situation. 4 Additionally, a "stop" and a "frisk"
amounted to a mere "minor inconvenience and petty indignity," which may be
imposed upon the citizen based on a police officer's suspicion, in the interest of
effective law enforcement. 5 Therefore the reasonableness of a search and seizure
must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances versus the reasonable
belief that a particular action is warranted. 6
The other side of the argument was that the authority of police must be strictly
limited in accordance with the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth
Amendment, the heart of which is a strict requirement for justification of any
intrusion upon protected personal security.7 Acquiescence in this strict control
would only serve to exacerbate existing police-community tensions. 8 The
Court's analysis continued:
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the officer's] conduct as a gen-
eral proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitution-
ally protected interests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails." And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion.39
Applying these principles to this case, the Court considered the state's interest
in effective crime prevention, the safety of the officer, and the personal security
interests of the defendants. The Court concluded by saying that "each case of
this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts."41
In United States v. Robinson,42 the defendant attempted to use Terry to limit a
search incident to a lawful arrest, to weapons and evidence only of the crime at
hand. Police arrested Robinson on probable cause that he was driving without a
valid permit. 3 When they searched him, the police found heroin in a crumpled
cigarette package in Robinson's coat pocket, and Robinson was subsequently
convicted on the heroin charge.4 The Court affirmed that it was reasonable for
34. Id. at 10-11.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 21-22 (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id. at 11-12.
39. Id. at20-21.
40. Id. at 22-23.
41. Id. at 30.
42. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 220-223. In this case there would be no fiurther evidence to find because Robinson was arrest-
ed for driving without a valid permit.
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the arresting officer to search the person for weapons. Otherwise, the officer's
safety might be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. 5 The Court also
declared that searches did not have to be solely for the purpose of the officer's
safety, but could also be to preserve evidence for the crime at hand or any other
crime the defendant may have committed.46 The Court stated that there was no
need to limit the search, because unlike Terry, this case was based on a lawful
arrest, and it was well settled that a full search incident to a lawful arrest was rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.47
The Court spent considerable time justifying its decision by recounting what
little case law existed on the subject prior to Weeks to show that a search accom-
panied by a lawful arrest was historically permitted.48 The Court then stated that
it did not agree that history required there to be a case-by-case determination of
proper authority to search in such a situation.49 Dissenting Justices Marshall,
Douglas, and Brennan expressed a different view:
Certain fundamental principles have characterized this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence over the years. Perhaps the most basic of
these was expressed by Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous
Court in Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931): "There is no
formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances." As we recently held: "The
constitutional validity of a warrantless search is preeminently the sort of
question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the
individual case." And the intensive, at times painstaking, case-by-case
analysis characteristic of our Fourth Amendment decisions bespeaks our
"jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of individual rights. o50
The Dissent chided the majority for coining new rules not based on precedent:
The majority states that "[a] police officer's determination as to how and
where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessari-
ly a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require
to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the
search." No precedent is cited for this broad assertion - not surprisingly,
since there is none. Indeed, we only recently rejected such "a rigid all-or-
nothing model of justification and regulation under the Amendment, [for]
it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initia-
tion, of police action as a means of constitutional regulation."
45. Id. at 226.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234-36.
48. Id. at 230-233.
49. Id. at 235. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell buttressed the majority position by stating that an
individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the priva-
cy of his person, such that there was no reason to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some independent jus-
tification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. Id. at 237-238.
50. Id. at 238 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 248-249 (citations omitted).
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Robinson thus marked a significant departure from long held views regarding the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
A second case decided on the same day and answering the same question of
search incident to arrest as in Robinson, was Gustafson v. Florida.52 In
Gustafson, police stopped a college student for weaving, arrested him for not
having his driver's license in his possession, and then fully searched him. Police
found a marihuana cigarette in defendant's coat pocket, for which he was subse-
quently convicted of possession. 3 This case differs from Robinson in that the
crime the defendant was arrested for was a trivial traffic offense, where an arrest
was not required.liv Although the Court held that the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment,"5 Justice Stewart's concurring opinion indicated disapproval
of a per se rule allowing warrantless arrests without regard to the triviality of the
offense. He stated that, had the defendant raised it, he might have had a persua-
sive claim that being arrested for a minor traffic offense in itself violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. 6
The reasonableness analysis of Terry was used in Pennsylvania v. Mimms to
allow an officer to order a motorist out of the car after lawfully stopping him for
a traffic violation. 7 The Court quoted Terry:
The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental inva-
sion of a citizen's personal security."58 Reasonableness, of course, depends
on "a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to per-
sonal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." 9
The Court balanced the officer's interest in having a standard safety practice,
requiring traffic violators to exit the vehicle, with what the Court described as
the de minimis additional intrusion on the motorist who had already been lawful-
ly stopped, concluding that "mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced
against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety."6
The Terry reasonableness analysis was finally used in favor of a citizen in
Delaware v. Prouse.61 The question was whether it was an unreasonable seizure
to stop an automobile on a public highway to check the driver's license and regis-
tration, in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the car was
being driven contrary to the motor vehicle laws or that either the car or any of its
occupants was subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of
any other applicable law.62
52. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
53. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 261-62.
54. Id. at 263.
55. Id. at 263-64.
56. Id. at 266-67.
57. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
58. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
60. Id. at 109-11.
61. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
62. Id. at 650. In this case, a patrolman in a police cruiser stopped Prouse's automobile, smelled mari-
huana smoke coming from the automobile, and seized marihuana in plain view on the car floor. Prouse was
subsequently indicted for illegal possession of a controlled substance. Id.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The Court held that the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,63 and admonished that the essential purpose for the Fourth
Amendment limits is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of
discretion of officers and other government officials, in order to "safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. '64 The Court stat-
ed that the permissibility of a law enforcement practice is judged by balancing
the law's intrusion on the individual's privacy and liberty interests against the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.6" The facts upon which an intru-
sion is based must be capable of being measured against an objective standard,
which can be probable cause or even less, or some other safeguard to "assure that
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion
of the official in the field."'66
In light of Terry's reduced requirement for probable cause for a "stop and
frisk," the Court in Dunaway v. New York 67reiterated the threshold requirement
for probable cause in an arrest situation. The Supreme Court held that
Dunaway's arrest was in violation of the Fourth Amendment because police had
no probable cause to arrest him.68 In response to the State's urging that the Court
apply a balancing test, the Court stated that in doing so, "the protections intend-
ed by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balanc-
ing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, especially
when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police officers engaged
in the 'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. ' ' 69 The Court went on
to say that for all but the narrowly defined intrusions of Terry, the requisite "bal-
ancing" had been performed in centuries of precedent and was embodied in the
principle that seizures are "reasonable" only if supported by probable cause.7"
Even with probable cause, some arrests are nevertheless in violation of the
Fourth Amendment if accomplished without a warrant. In Welsh v. Wisconsin,"
officers arrested defendant Welsh in his home after Welsh swerved off the road
and abandoned his vehicle in a field close to his home. The police forcefully
entered Welsh's home without a warrant.72 Under Wisconsin law, a first offense
for driving while intoxicated was a non-criminal violation subject to a civil for-
feiture proceeding for a maximum fine of $200."3 The Court held that the war-
rantless arrest of the defendant in his home violated the Fourth amendment even
though the state demonstrated probable cause to arrest:
63. Id. at 663. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari because jurisdictions were split in their deci-
sions on this issue. Id. at 651.
64. Id. at 653-54 (quotation omitted).
65. Id. at 654.
66. Id. at 654-55.
67. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In this case, police investigators received information from an informant that
Dunaway may have been involved in a robbery and homicide. Because they did not have enough information to
procure a warrant, they picked up Dunaway and brought him to the police station without a warrant or probable
cause, where he made incriminating statements. Id. at 203.
68. Id. at 213.
69. Id.
70. Id. at214.
71. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
72. Id. at 743.
73. Id. at 746.
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Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home,
the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances
that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all
warrantless home entries. When the government's interest is only to
arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is diffi-
cult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make
such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral
and detached magistrate. 4
The manner in which authorities execute a seizure also determines its validity
under the Fourth amendment, even where probable cause exists, and where the
seizure would have been allowed by common law. In Tennessee v. Garner,75
police officers shot and killed a fleeing and unarmed 15-year-old that police had
probable cause to believe had just committed a nighttime burglary.7 A Tennessee
statute allowed the shooting in that it gave officers authority to stop a fleeing sus-
pected felon, after notice of intent to arrest, using all necessary means.7 The
Court found that killing a suspect to prevent escape was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless officers have reason to believe the suspect is a threat
to themselves or the public. 8 The Court began its analysis by stating that there
could be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure,
subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Although
a police officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause to believe that per-
son committed a crime, the Court
"must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion."8 We have described "the bal-
ancing of competing interests" as "the key principle of the Fourth
Amendment."'" Because one of the factors is the extent of the intrusion,
it is plain that reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is
made, but also how it is carried out.82
In applying the balancing of interests to this case, the Court found that the "intru-
siveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched," that the "suspect's
fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon," and that the
use of deadly force frustrates the judicial determination of guilt and punish-
ment.83 The state's interests, on the other hand, are in effective law enforcement
74. Id. at 750 (citations and footnote omitted).
75. 471 U.S. 1(1985).
76. Id. at 3-4.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
81. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700, n.12 (1981)).
82. Id. (quoting United States v. Oritz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29
(1968)).
83. Id. at 9.
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and overall reduction of violence that would be seen by encouraging the peaceful
submission of suspects.84 The Court determined that the killing of nonviolent
suspects was not a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing these goals,
because use of deadly force was a "self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect
and so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion.""5
It is noteworthy that in Garner the Court stated that, although it often looked
to the common law in evaluating reasonableness, it "'has not simply frozen into
constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the
Fourth Amendment's passage, '  and that "reliance on the common-law rule in
this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical
inquiry."87 This is consistent with other decisions such as Vernonia School Dist.
47J v. Acton,B" where the Court stated:
As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a governmental search is "reasonableness." At
least in a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either
approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets
the reasonableness standard "'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests."' 89
In contrast, reliance on common law was the foundation for the decision in
Wilson v. Arkansas." The Court announced that the principle of knock and
announce forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. 1 In
evaluating the scope of this right, the Court looked to the traditional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the
time of the framing in an effort to give content to the term "reasonable."92
While the Court in Garner emphasized that the manner of seizure was a factor
in determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the Court in Whren v. United
States93 determined that the subjective motivation of police in making a stop is
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. at 13 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.573,591, n.33 (1980)).
87. Id. at 13.
88. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). InActon, parents of a high school student challenged the school district's policy
of random drug testing of athletes who participate in the school's athletic program. Id. at 651-52.
89. Id. at 652-653 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (quot-
ing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). This concept has been reiterated in a number of cases
including the 1999 case of Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
90. 514 U.S. 927 (1995). In Wilson, the police, armed with warrants to arrest the suspect and search the
premises, found the front door open and the screened door unlocked. They opened the screened door and
entered while at the same time announcing that they were the police. Once inside they seized drugs and arrest-
ed the defendant. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction noting that the officers were identify-
ing themselves as they entered, and rejected Wilson's argument that the Fourth Amendment required officers to
knock and announce prior to entering a residence. See id.
91. Id. at 934.
92. Id. at 931.
93. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, police became suspicious of two black men in a dark Pathfinder
truck, who were in a high crime area at night. When the police made a u-turn in their unmarked patrol car and
headed back toward the defendants, the defendants took off at a high rate of speed. When police stopped them
for the traffic violation, they saw two bags of crack cocaine in Whren's hands, and arrested the defendants on
drug charges. See id.
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irrelevant. 4 Although an automobile stop is subject to the constitutional impera-
tive that it not be unreasonable under the circumstances, the general rule is that
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, regardless of whether they
may have other motivations for stopping the vehicle. 5 The Court stated that
because the making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as
an extreme practice, it is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to
believe the law has been broken outbalances private interest in avoiding police
contact. 6 Thus, pretextual stops for purpose of searching a vehicle are reason-
able.
In summary, reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment has been deter-
mined in the past 100 years by a number of methods including reliance on com-
mon law, balancing the interests of the government and the citizens, and based on
per se rules that the Court has determined are necessary to enforce the protec-
tions of the Amendment. As these cases illustrate, reasonableness has always
been the hallmark of Fourth Amendment analysis.
III. THE CASE
A. Facts of the Arrest
Gail Atwater, a long-term resident of Lago Vista, Texas, along with her two
young children, was returning home from soccer practice on March 26, 1997.97
They were in their own residential neighborhood, driving 15 miles per hour,
when police officer Bart Turek detected that they were not wearing seat belts, in
violation of Texas Transportation Code Section 545.413,98 and he "set about to
protect the community from the perpetration of such a crime."99
Officer Turek pulled over the vehicle, approached the driver's side window,
and aggressively began jabbing his finger and screaming at Ms. Atwater, saying
that they had met before and accusing her of not caring for her children."'
Because this was frightening her children, Ms. Atwater requested, in a calm
voice, that Officer Turek lower his voice; but in response Officer Turek told Ms.
Atwater she was going to jail."1 He then demanded her driver's license and
proof of insurance, which are required by Texas law to be carried while driving,
but she was not able to present these items because her purse had been stolen a
few days earlier. 2 After she told Officer Turek this, he ridiculed her and implied
94. Id. at 809.
95. Id. at 818.
96. Id.
97. Atwater 165 E3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1999).
98. Texas Transportation Code Section 545.413 requires that if a car is equipped with safety belts, a
front-seat passenger must wear one, the driver must secure any small child riding in the front seat, and that a
violation of either provision is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not less than $25 or more than $50. Section
543.001 gives any peace officer the authority to arrest without warrant a person found in violation of one of the
transportation statutes, but authorizes a citation in lieu of arrest in return for a promise to appear in court. This
statute was updated in 2001 to increase the fine for the failure to secure children to $200.
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that she was a liar, even though he had pulled her over a couple of months earli-
er, when he mistakenly thought her son was not wearing a seatbelt, so he knew
that she had valid documents.
113
Ms. Atwater, who was not a threat to Officer Turek, and was not involved in
any illegal conduct apart from the seatbelt violation, remained calm, and asked
Officer Turek if he would allow her to take her children to a friend's home just
two houses away before he took her to jail."4 He refused to allow this and told
her that he would take the children to the police station with her.10 ' Several
bystanders witnessed Officer Turek's tirade, and fortunately, one of Ms.
Atwater's friends took the children into her care." 6
Officer Turek then handcuffed Atwater's hands behind her back, put her into
his patrol car, and took her to the police station.0 7 At the station, officers confis-
cated her personal belongings, including her shoes, took her "mug shot," and put
her in a jail cell to wait." 8 Although she could legally have been held for up to
48 hours,09 she was taken to a magistrate after an hour, and was released after
posting a bond for $310."' Ms. Atwater pleaded no contest to failing to wear a
seat belt and failing to put her children in seatbelts, and was fined $50.111 The
charges for driving without a license or proof of insurance were dropped.12
B. Lower Court Decision
Atwater and her husband Michael Haas, as next friend for her children, filed
suit in state court against the City of Lago Vista, Officer Turek, and the Chief of
Police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985, alleging violations of Ms. Atwater's
rights to be free from unreasonable seizures, along with other state and federal
charges. 13 The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas. The court granted summary judgment, holding
that the Fourth Amendment claim was meritless because Atwater had admitted
that she broke the law, and there was no allegation that she was harmed or
detained in any way inconsistent with the law.
114
C. Fifth Circuit Panel Decision
Atwater appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed
the District Court, holding that "an arrest for a first-time seat belt offense was an
unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," and in








109. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364 (O'Connor, dissenting).





115. Id. (citations omitted).
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The Fifth Circuit panel looked at two questions - first, whether Atwater
alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; second, whether
Turek's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law as
of the time of the conduct in question."' Even though the panel determined that
there was no established precedent regarding the arrest of a seat-belt-law viola-
tor, it concluded that it is "clearly established that even where there is probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed, any seizure which is conducted
in an extraordinary manner or which constitutes an extreme practice must meet
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." '117 Supporting this
contention, the court cited Knowles v. Iowa,"1 8 a 1998 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion, that required a Fourth Amendment analysis of reasonableness even where
the state law allowed an officer to search a vehicle during a traffic stop. "9
The panel contrasted "paternalistic" laws with other traffic laws when they
weighed the governmental interest in law enforcement against individual privacy
interests under the Fourth Amendment. 2 Paternalistic laws, such as the seat-belt
laws, are those that protect an individual who poses no threat to the public from
his own conduct, while other traffic laws are those that can protect users of the
roadways from violators of these traffic laws. 21  "The governmental interest in
arresting an individual for a [paternalistic] seat belt violation is much less than in
the case of other traffic violations which can have an immediate impact on the
public at large." '122
D. Fifth Circuit en Banc Decision
The Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, vacated the panel decision, and
subsequently reversed the panel and reinstated the summary judgment granted by
the District Court. 23 The decision was split 11 to 6, and contained three dissent-
ing opinions."' The majority quoted from Tennessee v. Garner.2 that "[tjo deter-
mine the constitutionality of an arrest, '[w]e must balance the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. '126
Instead of doing this, the court then quoted Whren v. United States saying, "if an
arrest is based on probable cause then 'with rare exceptions ... the result of that
balancing is not in doubt.' 1 27 Without performing a balancing test on the facts of
the case, the court determined that "when probable cause exists to believe that a
suspect is committing an offense, the government's interests in enforcing its
laws outweigh the suspect's privacy interests, and an arrest of the suspect is rea-
116. Atwater, 165 E3d at 384.
117. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
118. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
119. Atwater, 165 E3d at 386 (citing Knowles, 525 U.S. at 113).
120. Id. at 385.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 389.
123. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
124. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 243.
125. 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
126. Id.
127. Atwater, 195 F3d at 244 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1966)).
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sonable."'28 The majority explained that it "deviate[s] from this principal... only
when an arrest is 'conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an
individual's privacy or even physical interests."'129 It concluded that based on the
record, Officer Turek did not conduct the arrest in such an extraordinary manner
unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests because the only physical con-
tact between Turek and Atwater happened when he handcuffed her and that
Atwater did not complain of any physical harm.13 This was contrary to the fact
that one of Atwater's claims was for infliction of emotional distress,' which the
court did not discuss in its reasonableness analysis.'32
The dissenting opinions brought up several issues not addressed in the majori-
ty opinion. First, the Atwater arrest was unreasonable and uncalled for because
there was no evidence that there was a need for the arrest and the offender was in
no way a danger to anyone.'33 The expectation of citizens is that fine-only traffic
violations are dealt with by the issuance of a traffic citation, and that arrests only
occur when there are other reasons such as evidence of intoxication or evidence
of an illegal weapon in the vehicle.'34 Additionally, probable cause to make a stop
and arrest does not allow the police to do whatever they want; it can't immunize
them against a constitutional violation. 135
Second, the decision was counter to the longstanding Supreme Court precedent
that every Fourth Amendment analysis must be the result of a balancing of indi-
vidual and government interests.'36 In this case, the only conceivable reason for
Atwater's full custodial arrest was Officer Turek's "illegitimate desire" to punish
her. 37 "In justifying [a] particular intrusion [a] police officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."'38  "Allowing Officer Turek
to skate here gives the officer on the street carte blanche to be a one-person cop
cum judge cum jury cum executioner. In effect, he can arrest, charge, try, convict,
and both assess and inflict punishment."'39 It has the effect of licensing the rare
rogue patrol officer to inflict vigilante punishment on a citizen under the guise of
an arrest, a state of affairs clearly not tolerated by the Constitution. "'
Third, in response to the majority's conclusion that the arrest was not conduct-
ed in an extraordinary manner, Judge Weiner challenged that "[I]t need hardly be
said that a full custodial arrest, complete with behind-the-back-handcuffing,
transporting to jail, and booking, is an extraordinary response to a local mother's
daytime seatbelt violation."''
128. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
129. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 818).
130. Id. at 245-46.
131. Id. at 244, n.1.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 246-47.
134. Id. at 246.
135. Id. at 247 (Garza J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 247-48 (Weiner J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 249 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968)).
139. Id. at250.
140. Id. at251.
141. Id. at 249.
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E. The Atwater Argument
Atwater's main contention was that custodial arrest for the fine-only offense
of not wearing a seat belt violates the Fourth Amendment's requirement that all
seizures be reasonable.142 Atwater suggested a two-step approach. The Court
must first ask whether the action would have been prohibited at common law
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. If the answer is unclear, the Court
must then evaluate the reasonableness of the action by balancing the degree of
the intrusion on the individual against the degree to which the intrusion is neces-
sary to promote a legitimate governmental interest. 43 Atwater argued that war-
rantless arrests for misdemeanors that were not breaches of the peace were not
permitted at the time when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. However, if his-
tory is viewed as not providing a clear answer in this regard, balancing the com-
peting interests would show that arresting her furthered no legitimate law
enforcement objective, which could not have been furthered by a simple, less
intrusive, traffic citation. 44
Atwater claimed that the lower court ignored precedent and created a broad
per se rule stating all custodial arrests are valid as long as there is probable cause
to believe that an offense has occurred.14 She argued that the Supreme Court has
never held this to be law, and proposed a rule that would be consistent with
Supreme Court rulings. 46 The rule would also promote good public policy: "The
Fourth Amendment prohibits custodial arrests for fine-only traffic offenses
except when the arrest is necessary for enforcement of the traffic laws or when
the offense would otherwise continue and pose a danger to others on the road."'47
E City ' argument
The City argued that the U.S. Supreme Court has "continually held that the
touchstone for evaluating whether a seizure was proper under the Fourth
Amendment is probable cause."' 48 The exception is for those arrests made that
are unreasonable in manner or duration, evaluated as to whether the arrest was
accomplished in an "extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's
privacy or physical interest." '49
The City also argued that Atwater was seeking a rule that would require more
than probable cause in some cases, and that this rule would confuse the purposes
of arrest and punishment. Also, the rule would invite uncertainty among the
many jurisdictions of the country.5 In addition, fears of racial profiling do not
justify a new rule, because this practice is prohibited by the constitutional guar-
antee of equal protection.5 Finally, the City contended that there was no com-
142. Petitioner's Brief at 6., Atwater (No. 99-1408).
143. Id. at 6 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).




148. Respondent's Brief at 4., Atwater (No. 99-1408).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id.
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mon law rule incorporated into the Fourth Amendment that limited warrantless
misdemeanor arrests to instances that constitute a breach of the peace." 2
IV INSTANT CASE
A. Holding
Justice Souter authored the Court's five-four decision in Atwater, in which
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy joined."' 2 The Court held:
[T]he standard of probable cause "applies to all arrests, without the need
to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular situa-
tions." If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.54
The majority addressed Atwater's two-part argument by first considering the
contention that at common law, warrantless misdemeanor arrests by peace offi-
cers were prohibited except in cases of breach of the peace, which Atwater
described as non-felony offenses tending toward violence. 55 Atwater quoted
from the 1925 case of Carroll v. United States:56
In cases of misdemeanor, a peace officer like a private person has at
common law no power of arresting without a warrant except when a
breach of the peace has been committed in his presence or there is rea-
sonable ground for supposing that a breach of peace is about to be com-
mitted or renewed in his presence." 7
The majority spent a considerable portion of its decision thoroughly reviewing
historical texts, legislation and case law associated with pre- and post- Fourth
Amendment ratification. They ultimately concluded that Atwater's argument
failed.55 in that, even though not unequivocal, history "has expressed a decided,
majority view that police need not obtain an arrest warrant merely because a
misdemeanor stopped short of violence . . . .""' The majority stopped short of
saying that the Framer's concept of reasonableness of warrantless arrest authority
was dispositive 60
The majority then considered Atwater's contention, 6 ' as explained in the 1999
Supreme Court case of Wyoming v. Houghton, 62 that when the Court first
152. Id. at 6.
153. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 322.
154. Id. at 354 (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 326-27.
156. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
157. Id. at 157 (quoting HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Vol. 9, part III, 612).
158. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318.
159. Id. at 345.
160. Id. at 326.
161. Id. at 345-46.
162. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
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inquires whether a particular action was lawful at common law, and the answer is
inconclusive, the Court must evaluate the action under traditional standards of
reasonableness, by assessing the degree of intrusion upon an individual's privacy
against the need to promote legitimate governmental interests."6 3 In conjunction
with this argument, the Court considered the rule Atwater proposed forbidding
custodial arrest for a fine-only offense when the government can show no need
for the arrest."
The majority conceded that if it were to derive a rule based solely on the facts
of her case, Atwater might prevail.16 But it added that the Court has "traditional-
ly recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need,
lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review."'66 Thus, the Court rejected Atwater's proposed rule. The
majority justified its decision for two primary reasons. First, in many cases,
decisions must be made on the spur of the moment, and this requires that the
government have readily administrable rules, in order for the decision to later
survive judicial scrutiny.167 In addition, the Court stated that Atwater's rule was
not as simple as it seemed due to complications that would arise when police
tried to use Atwater's proposed criteria. 6 Atwater had proposed the following
rule:
The Fourth Amendment prohibits custodial arrests for fine-only traffic
offenses except when the arrest is necessary for enforcement of the traf-
fic laws or when the offense would otherwise continue and pose a dan-
ger to others on the road. 69
The majority warned that confusion would arise because some violations have
different penalties depending on the number of prior offenses, which may be
impossible to determine on the scene and because police cannot be expected to
know the details of complex penalty schemes. 7' The majority feared that this rule
would put police in an almost impossible position, setting them up for personal
liability for making the wrong decision, 71 and it would guarantee increased litiga-
tion as a result of such arrests. '72 In addition, there would be a disincentive to
arrest if the officer followed the simple rule "if in doubt, do not arrest," even in
situations where an important public interest would be served by an arrest, possi-
bly costing society more than the alternative of the needless arrest of a few.'73
163. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 347 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973)).
167. Id. (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 458).
168. Id. at 348.
169. Petitioner's Brief at 46.
170. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348-49.
171. Id. at 350.
172. 1d. (citing Watson, 423 U.S. at 423-24) ( "The judgment of the Nation and Congress has . . long
been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions
with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a
warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.").
173. Id. at351.
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The majority expressed other doubts that additional Fourth Amendment pro-
tection was warranted in this case, including that it was not clear that the prob-
lem was very pervasive, nor very damaging to the arrestee, and that there were
other methods including the voting booth for alleviating the problem.174 Finally,
the majority established a new rule:
[T]he standard of probable cause "applies to all arrests, without the need
to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular situa-
tions." If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.
1 75
The Court went on to say that Officer Turek was authorized under Texas law to
make the arrest, and that, while the arrest was surely humiliating, it was not
made in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Ms. Atwater's privacy or
physical interests.17' Thus, the awkward requirement for the Court to weigh Ms.
Atwater's interest in not being harassed at the discretion of Officer Turek, against
the city's interest in jailing Ms. Atwater, was not discussed.
B. The Dissent
In contrast, Justice O'Connor argued convincingly that the majority's position
was not only unsupported by Supreme Court precedent, but that it ran contrary to
the principles that lay at the core of the Fourth Amendment. 17  Whereas the
majority did not find it necessary to consider the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment in deciding this case, the dissent opined that it was a
mandate: "When a full custodial arrest is effected without a warrant, the plain
language of the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrest be reasonable." '78 The
dissent then cited six Supreme Court cases since 1968 reiterating the position of
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio that "[t]he touchstone of our analysis under
the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.'
' 179
Although the dissent agreed that the Court often looks to the common law in
evaluating the reasonableness of police activity under the Fourth Amendment, 8 '
it said that history was just one of the tools used in conducting the reasonable-
ness inquiry.81 The dissent pointed out that the majority had very adequately
shown that history was not conclusive of the issue in this case. 82 O'Connor
agreed with Atwater's contention that when history is inconclusive, the Court
evaluates the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness.18 3 It
174. Id. at 351-53.
175. Id. at 354.
176. Id.
177. Id. at362.
178. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 360 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
179. Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 361 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 13).
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does this by addressing the degree to which the seizure or search intrudes upon
individual privacy, and weighing this against the degree to which the seizure or
search is required to promote a legitimate governmental interest.184 "In determin-
ing reasonableness, '[e]ach case is to be decided on its own facts and circum-
stances."l""
The dissent reiterated the majority position that if a reasonableness analysis
were performed on the facts of this case, Atwater would win. The result of the
analysis being that "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity and con-
finement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her
case." '16 The dissent then correctly noted that the majority allowed itself to be
swayed by the worry that "every discretionary judgment in the field [will] be con-
verted into an occasion for constitutional review." '187 The dissent also accused the
majority of minting its own new rule: "If an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his pres-
ence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." '188 In
addition, the dissent relied on Gustafson v. Florida and United States v. Robinson
to show that when the issue of arrest for a fine-only offense had presented itself,
the Court indicated disapproval.188
In response to the majority rule that probable cause by itself is sufficient to
allow arrest for any offense, the dissent argued that because there was no clear
rule in this particular situation, the Court "must engage in the balancing test
required by the Fourth Amendment."" It stated that "any realistic assessment of
the interests implicated by such arrests demonstrates that probable cause alone is
not a sufficient condition." '
The dissent raised the issue that a full custodial arrest entails a much greater
intrusion on individual liberty and privacy interests than a mere traffic stop.1"2
The expectation of the motorist is that he will be detained for a short while for a
traffic violation, and then be allowed to go on his way after the brief stop.193
Thus, the government interest in enforcing the law outweighs the limited intru-
sion of the traffic stop.'93 However, the dissent maintained that it was certainly
not conclusive that the government interest in preventing fine-only offenses
would outweigh an individual's privacy interests in avoiding a full custodial
arrest.'95
In an effort to expose the interests at issue, the dissent discussed the toll that is
exacted on an individual's liberty and privacy, even when the arrest is brief,
because the arrestee is subjected to a full search of his person, along with confis-
184. Id. (citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Garner, 417 U.S. at 13; Prouse, 440
U.S. at 654; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106).
185. Id. (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 357).
186. Id. (quoting the majority opinion).
187. Id. (quoting majority opinion).
188. Id. at 361-62 (quoting majority opinion).
189. Id. at 362 (citing Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266-67; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 238).
190. Id. at 363.
191. Id. (citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300) (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213-14)).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 363-64.
194. Id. at 364.
195. Id. (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 818).
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cation of his possessions, and a full search of his automobile, including any con-
tainers within the vehicle.196 Other intrusions include possibly dangerous condi-
tions during the up to 48 hour stay in a jail cell with other unknown incarcerated
persons, and the fact that this event would be part of the individual's permanent
driving record.197
The dissent reminded the Court that in analyzing the government interest
involved in this case, the Court has said that the penalty attaching to any particu-
lar offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the
State's interest in arresting suspected violators of that offense.19 If the State has
determined that a fine, and not imprisonment, is appropriate, then the state's
interest in arresting that individual is limited. 99 A citation would be sufficient to
satisfy the State's interests as effectively as an arrest."00
"Because a full custodial arrest is such a severe intrusion on an individual's
liberty, its reasonableness hinges on 'the degree to which it is needed for the pro-
motion of legitimate governmental interests.""" In light of other available means
to promote the State's interest in enforcing fine-only laws, the dissent charged
that it was unacceptable to deem full custodial arrest reasonable in every circum-
stance, particularly when it means giving constitutional carte blanche to arrest in
any circumstance where there is probable cause."0 '
Turning to the desire of the majority for a bright line rule focused only on
probable cause, the dissent again stated that probable cause itself is not ade-
quate.0 3 "While clarity is certainly a value worthy of consideration in our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, it by no means trumps the values of liberty and priva-
cy at the heart of the Amendment's protections." ' 4 Concerning the fears of the
majority that officers would be subject to personal liability for fine-only arrests,
the dissent argued that these concerns are more than adequately resolved by the
doctrine of qualified immunity.
205
In applying the facts of the case, the dissent declared that it is "abundantly
clear that Ms. Atwater's arrest was constitutionally unreasonable." ' 6 A citation
would have served the government's interest and the public's interest much better,
and it would have particularly served the children's interests much better, consid-
ering that they were traumatized by the event.07
V ANALYSIS
If there is a consistent theme in Fourth Amendment case law, it is that the
validity of a search or seizure must ultimately be determined by its reasonable-
196. Id. (citing NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
197. Id. at 364-65.
198. Id. at 365. (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984)).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300).
202. Id. at 365-66.
203. Id. at 366.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 366-67
206. Id. at 368.
207. Id. at 370.
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ness. As explained in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United States,"8 to protect the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,09 a balancing of the individual's pri-
vacy and security interests must be weighed against the government's interest in
effective law enforcement to determine if a police action is reasonable and thus
constitutionally allowed. Even though a review of case law shows that the pro-
tections of the Fourth amendment have been eroded over the years, the Supreme
Court has always justified the incremental changes by demonstrating that gov-
ernmental or public interests outweigh the interests of the individual in a certain,
generally narrow, set of circumstances. Even in Robinson, which the majority
depends on for the proposition that there is no need for a case-by-case justifica-
tion of the authority to search after a legitimate arrest has taken place, the rule
was based on the reasonableness in discovering weapons (for police protection)
and evidence (to prevent destruction) incident to an already valid arrest.21
Additionally, the strong dissent in Robinson chided the majority for issuing a rule
counter to precedent.211
The present case coins a new test for the new situation of arrest for a fine-only
offense, which is counter to the precedent of the Court, against the plain lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment, and without the benefit of a reasonableness
analysis or balancing test. The new rule states:
[T]he standard of probable cause 'applies to all arrests, without the need
to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular situa-
tions.' If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has
committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.212
The new rule uses probable cause as an independent reasonableness standard,
when precedent has always viewed probable cause as a threshold factor for
arrests and searches, requiring these arrests to be reasonable even where proba-
ble cause existed. Although the majority quoted from Dunaway v. New York for
this rule, the Dunaway decision was demanding a minimum standard of probable
cause where the government was proposing that reasonable suspicion was ade-
quate for the arrest.213 The second part of the test, that of reasonableness, was
never reached, since the lack of probable cause was enough to show a Fourth
Amendment violation.
214
The majority quoted from Robinson for the proposition that "a responsible
Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive,
case-by-case determinations of government need ... "215 In Robinson, the issue
208. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. IV
210. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226-28.
211. Id. at248-49.
212. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
213. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210-12.
214. See generally id. at 200.
215. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35).
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was whether, after a suspect had been arrested on probable cause and was about
to be taken to the police station, a search incident to this arrest should be limited
to the type of crime for which he was arrested.216 A clear analysis was done
showing that it would not lessen the potential danger to the officer if the suspect
was picked up for traffic violation or for something much worse. The legitimate
government interest was for the police officer to transport the suspect safely;
therefore, there was no need for the officer to concern himself with an unneces-
sary decision. In the Atwater case, the government had no reason or interest in
taking Ms. Atwater to jail, so any attempt to find the arrest reasonable would fail.
The new rule does not provide for "reasonableness in all the circumstances of
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security" as Terry
requires, nor does it provide that reasonableness depend "on a balance between
the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbi-
trary interference by law officers as Mimms requires, nor does it comport with
Garner, which requires the balancing of competing interests to be the guiding
principle of the Fourth Amendment." '217
Although the language of the majority holding seems to suggest a per se rule
that all arrests are always reasonable if accompanied by probable cause, the appli-
cation of the holding to the instant case discusses three elements: 1) there must be
probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been committed; 2) there
must be a statute authorizing the arrest;218 and 3) the arrest must not be made in
an "extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to privacy or physical interests."2 9
In applying the new rule to the facts of the case, however, the majority simply
makes an assertion, without analysis, that Atwater's arrest was not made in an
extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Ms. Atwater's privacy."' The majori-
ty points to Whren v. United States, Tennessee v. Garner, and Wilson v. Arkansas,
among others, to illustrate what this means."' In each of these cases, however,
the Court performed a thorough balancing of interests in determining whether the
manner of the search or seizure was reasonable and thus constitutional.
In Garner, the Court admonished the State in its assertion that, since an arrest
is legitimate when probable cause is present, the Fourth Amendment has nothing
to say about how the arrest is made. The Court said:
This submission ignores the many cases in which this Court, by balanc-
ing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, has examined the
reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is conducted.
To determine the constitutionality of a seizure "[w]e must balance the
216. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233-35.
217. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8. (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452, U.S. 692,700, n.12 (1981).
218. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. Although in this case Texas law authorized the arrest, it is not clear in this
opinion if a state law authorizing an arrest is required, since the plain text of the rule does not require it and the
majority states that States are free to impose restrictive safeguards. See also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S.
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nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion." We have described "the balancing of competing
interests" as "the key principle of the Fourth Amendment." '222
Thus, to give meaning to the term "extraordinary manner," it appears that the
only guidance given is to balance the privacy interests of the individual against
the governmental interests for the intrusion - exactly what the majority has deter-
mined is no longer necessary. According to the dissent, had the Court done this,
it would not have been able to say that Atwater's arrest was not done in an unusu-
ally harmful manner. 3 What is harmful to an individual depends on the expecta-
tion of the individual in the specific circumstance. The expectation of a bank
robber is necessarily different from the expectation of a soccer mom to the
specter of an arrest. As stated in Terry, when an individual harbors a reasonable
expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion. Also, as stated in Robinson, which the majority relies on heavily to
waive the case-by-case reasonableness test, an arrest is wholly different from a
search; it is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution.224 Clearly, an individual
would not expect criminal prosecution to take place for a fine-only offense.
The majority's justification for the new rule is to eliminate the requirement for
officers to have to make complex decisions in the field, and to prevent the moun-
tain of litigation that might ensue from these complex situations.22 Although it
is clear that a bright-line rule would benefit administrative efficiency, it appears
that none has been created here if the pertinent question of reasonableness has
only been shifted to the issue of what is an "extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to privacy or physical interests."
In each of the major cases leading to this opinion, the Court stressed the
importance of the requirement for a balancing test. In Carroll v. United States,
the "automobile exception" was allowed because of the ease by which a car
could be driven out of the jurisdiction, and only when accompanied by objective
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant. The reasonableness analysis
centered around the interest in protecting individual liberty as well as promoting
the public interest as specified by Congress in the Prohibition Act.
In the pivotal case of Terry v. Ohio, a thorough analysis of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness was completed in determining that a "pat down" of suspicious
individuals was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court
weighed the interests of the State along with the personal safety interests of
police officers against what was considered slight inconvenience of some citi-
zens, in allowing the limited searches for investigative purposes. In Terry, the
Court stated that there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.
Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
222. Garner 471 U.S. at 7-8.
223. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 368.
224. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 228.
225. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347-350.
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In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, finding it reasonable for an officer to order a driver
out of her vehicle as a matter of course for a traffic stop, was based on the degree
of protection that was offered the officer versus a mere inconvenience on the part
of the driver. More recently in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, the decision
that drug testing of student athletes was not unreasonable was based on the com-
pelling state interest to prevent drug addiction versus the decreased expectation
of privacy of the student athletes to not be tested for drugs. Thus, it is clear that
it is counter to Court precedent for the Court to decline to apply the Fourth
Amendment balancing test to this new and untested situation.
It might be beneficial to look at the question from another viewpoint. The
Fifth Circuit panel concluded that if the Texas law authorized arrest in every
instance of a seat-belt violation, this law would certainly be subject to a Fourth
Amendment challenge. 26 However, based on the majority opinion in the present
case, this law would be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The statute
would allow it, and since it was not unreasonably harmful to the privacy interests
of Ms. Atwater, it would probably not be unreasonably harmful to the privacy
interests of other drivers. Of course, the majority's position that lawmakers cre-
ating such a law would soon be voted out of office would take care of drivers in
the long term, but at the price of many arrested drivers and a huge social cost in
the short term.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court has already endorsed the concept of pretextual stops for purposes
of drug interdiction by its decision in Whren v. United States. The current deci-
sion extends Whren by allowing indiscriminate warrantless searches of vehicles
based on pretextual misdemeanor stops. When a person is arrested, his vehicle
and all containers in the vehicle may be searched.227 Therefore, if an officer is
diligent enough, he will be able to find some minor violation for which he can
arrest the driver, and then search the car, albeit at the cost of hauling the driver to
the police station. This in essence becomes an indiscriminant stop, the purpose
for which is to discover general criminal violations, counter to the holding of
Delaware v. Prouse.
The decision in this case will likely remove any fear a police officer may have
concerning personal liability for his or her conduct when stopping citizens on the
streets. This in turn may well increase the indiscriminant harassment of individ-
uals on the streets, and will lessen the general respect given to laws and law offi-
cers by the citizenry.
226. Atwater, 165 E3d at 385.
227. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364.
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The majority admits that if it were to undertake a reasonableness analysis in
this case, Atwater would win. Therefore, in an effort to ease the burden of the
police officer in the field and the backlog of cases in the courts, the majority has
created a new rule for Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, which is
unsupported by Court precedent, counter to the core principles of the Fourth
Amendment, and even counter to the supporting authority cited in the case.
Could it be possible that the majority is simply putting the burden to prevent this
type of unreasonable seizure back on the citizens who would be most affected by
it, by either forbidding the initial passage of paternalistic laws that have no real
government interest to begin with, or by passing legislation to prohibit arrests for
these trivial offenses? Whatever the reason, allowing the reasonableness require-
ment to be removed from the Fourth Amendment reasonableness clause does not






We have acquired the entire
back stock, reprint and
microform rights to the
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
Complete sets to date
are now available. We
can also furnish single
volumes and issues.
WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
1285 MAIN STREET
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14209
